Case study: DDR Afghanistan
In 2003, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) initiated the Afghan New Beginnings Programme (ANBP), which lasted until March 2011. The Afghan president was responsible for the programme, which was to support the Afghan government in the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants. The ANBP was mostly financed by Japan, but also by the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States, the Netherlands, the European Union, Norway, Switzerland and the European Commission. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) managed and implemented the Programme with the help of the International Security Assistance Force, ISAF. The Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission (D&RC) instituted by the Afghan government co-ordinated the process.
UNAMA identified around 83,000 armed fighters to participate in the DDR programme. They were either to be reintegrated into civilian life or recruited into the newly established Afghan Army or police force. The intention was to dissolve informal and formal military structures prevailing from the times of the Taliban and to re-establish the rule of law and the authority of the Afghan government by building up a national army and police force.
To reach this goal, the warring parties had to first give up their heavy weaponry that were then stored in various locations in the country. As a second step, the various different armed groups had to be dissolved.
Between 2004 and 2005, about 60,000 men were demobilised. In contrast to DDR programmes in other countries, the former combatants were not assembled in camps but rather demobilised in their homes. Fighters who wanted to return to civilian life had to pass through various stages: First, they had to hand in their weapons. Then, their units were inspected during a last parade where some fighters were awarded with a medal. Each fighter was then formally demobilised and received 200 US dollars in Afghani, 130 kg of foodstuffs and some commodities.
Finally, each ex-combatant was given advice on his future civilian career. About 44 per cent decided in favour of a job in farming for which they were given tools or seedlings while 39 per cent chose crafts such as carpentry, mechanics or tailoring. Eight per cent wanted to become self-employed and enjoyed further training in business as well as advice on how to start up a new business. The remaining nine per cent joined the army or the police or were trained as mine sweepers.
One major challenge in Afghanistan was (and still is) the influence of so-called warlords. These commanders from the time of the Taliban still have a substantial amount of power and support from the population. They rely on armed units that are loyal towards them and not the central government. To reintegrate these individuals, who are a potential threat to the stabilisation process, the government (?) created special incentives in the framework of the Commanders Incentive Programme (CIP). It offered high-ranking commanders (e.g. from Brigadiers upwards) various attractive reintegration incentives, such as financial support during their unemployment to secure a minimum income, business training as well as travels abroad. About 450 high-ranking commanders took up the offer.
Child soldiers in Afghanistan, too, needed special support. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) initiated special demobilisation and reintegration programmes for children of up to 17 years of age who had been involved in the fighting. These programmes offered schooling and further training, included literacy courses as well as medical care and food aid.
DDR in Afghanistan also dealt with the dissolution of illegally armed groups of people who, for instance, were not registered as official fighters because they had fought as 'part-time guerrillas', The Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) project, which was established in the framework of the ANBP programme, aimed at improving security by encouraging all armed groups to dissolve.
To advance DDR in Afghanistan, an additional Reintegration Support Project (RSP) was initiated to sensitise government officials for questions concerning the reintegration of former combatants and to build capacity for the DDR process. The project ended in 2007.
Costs and success of the DDR process
All costs of these projects were met by international donors. A total of US $141 million has been spent on DDR.The leading country for the DDR process, Japan, has contributed US $91 million. Other countries (the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States, Italy, Germany and the European Commission) have paid several million of US dollars each.
There are different perspectives of the success of the DDR process in Afghanistan. On the one hand, it has succeeded in disarming and demobilising fighting units that otherwise could have been a major problem for the new government. This affects 60,000 to 70,000 fighters who were visibly integrated into civilian life.
On the other hand, some former combatants, when asked, indicated that they were dissatisfied with the process and that they encountered difficulties when trying to find a satisfying civilian job. Some commanders often maintained a core of loyal fighters around them to pressure officials into providing them with politically lucrative positions in the government. And some younger fighters, not long after having been demobilised, fell victim to the temptation of closing ranks with the Taliban who had regained strength, or with other fighting rebel groups in Afghanistan.
