Case study: DDR in Sudan
The 9 July 2011 was a historic day for the whole of Sudan: The south seceded from the rest of the country and became a new state: The Republic of South Sudan. It had been a long and bloody journey. Many years of civil war had prevailed between the North and the South. Since 1983, the major conflict parties, that is the government forces (the Sudan Armed Forces–SAF) and the rebels of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) had been fighting each other.
On 9 January 2005, the government of Sudan and the SPLA signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). After the war, the United Nations mandated the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) in March 2005 to support Sudan in its implementation of the peace agreement. Besides the autonomy of South Sudan and free and fair elections, the parties agreed that the South would be allowed to hold a referendum after six years (2011) about whether the country was to remain in the state union with the North or whether it was going to become an independent state. In the framework of the CPA, both parties agreed on the demobilisation of 90,000 fighters respectively in both parts of the country. To support this process, the United Nations established an independent unit consisting of representatives from UNMIS, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF). UNDP was tasked to manage the finances that states like Germany had provided for the programme. The government also established two commissions, one in the north, one in the south of Sudan to observe the planning and implementation of the DDR programme.
However, the start of the DDR programme, initially planned for the summer of 2005, was delayed by nearly four years to the spring of 2009. The main reason for this is likely the slow build-up of UNMIS that only reached its full capacity in South Sudan in 2007/8. Until then, armed militias whose loyalty was often unclear patrolled large parts of the country. The transitional government of Southern Sudan, dominated by the SPLA, reacted to that threat by integrating further groups into its armed forces. With its considerable oil revenues, it thus created a well-paid but ethnically and politically heterogeneous army with initially 60,000 fighters at the end of the war to more than 200,000 soldiers at the time of independence. In the extremely poor and underdeveloped Southern Sudan, a military position guaranteed a secure income and social prestige. This made the task of the DDR programme all the more difficult as only a few civilian jobs offered a similar income.
The DDR programme offered ex-combatants a relatively short vocational training as a carpenter or car mechanic. Other former combatants decided to become independent and work as a market trader or farmer. The DDR programme was mainly funded by the Western donor community, which Germany is part of. Given the uncertainly of Southern Sudan’s future, it is not surprising that not many soldiers volunteered to be demobilised. Those who were demobilised were mostly former child soldiers, women and the war wounded as well as elderly members of the conflict parties. Younger and healthier soldiers, however, remained on the pay list of the military—also against the background of ongoing tensions between the North and South of Sudan. In many ways, the DDR programme was similar to a charity programme for war veterans and did not directly contribute to the disarmament of the warring parties or to the stabilisation of the country.
Unfortunately DDR in the North and South of Sudan has not met any expectations. By independence, a mere 37,000 former fighters were demobilised in (North) Sudan. In South Sudan, less than half of this number—only 12,000. There are various reasons for these relatively low figures: On the one hand, the massive delay at the start of the programme made it unattractive to mainly well-paid SPLA members in Southern Sudan—had it started earlier, this might have been different. On the other hand, the lack of standardisation was an issue: In the one part of the country, ex-combatants were given money as part of their reintegration support, in others, they were not. Some reintegration measures lasted longer than others, some were more intense, depending on the implementing organisation. There was no transparency on the criteria for eligibility in the DDR programme, The government of Southern Sudan complained that international organisations used funds earmarked for the DDR programme to fund high wages of their own staff, while former fighters only profited from a relatively small share of the money. Internal investigations at the United Nations have confirmed some of the complaints.
Finally, the programme was neither sufficiently adjusted to the conditions in Sudan and its regions nor to the wishes of the political and military leadership. It also frustrated the participants, whose unfulfilled expectations led in part to violent protest. Instead of contributing to a more peaceful country, the DDR programme increased tensions and exacerbated internal conflicts.
In early 2011, disarmament and demobilisation were put on hold based on the aforementioned results. In the North of Sudan, the process, however, continued until July 2011 when the peace mission left the country. The pressing issue in South Sudan was the reduction of the security forces—by 150.000 soldiers within six to eight years. It is intended to achieve this by an increase in further vocational trainings and an improvement of the financial situation of the participants. In North Sudan, on the contrary, it is intended to demobilise a further 50,000 participants by the end of 2013. Here, the focus will lie on the support of receiving communities and the establishment of co-operatives.
The DDR programme in Sudan is a good example of how important it is to understand disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration as a politically sensitive undertaking that must be adapted to the conditions on the ground and take the expectations of the respective government into account.
