Case study: peace missions in Sudan and South Sudan

For nearly 40 years, civil war waged between north and south Sudan. The south wanted more access to political power and development benefits from the northern government which, since colonial times, had been limited to a small region in the triangle between the capital Khartoum, the Blue, and the White Nile. Since the 1980s, south Sudanese rebels aimed to gain control over the southern Sudanese oil production areas. Only in the early 2000s did the protracted peace negotiations between the government of Sudan and the southern resistance movement, SPLM/A (Sudan People's Liberation Army / Movement), start to bear fruit. Yet, other disadvantaged regions and their representatives in society were excluded from these negotiations about the distribution of power and riches or hopes for regional autonomy. In Darfur, a region that, just like south Sudan, was severely disadvantaged economically and politically, violent conflict between resistance groups and the Sudanese government in Khartoum began to escalate.

In 2005, the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A signed the historic Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). It agreed upon the establishment of an autonomous regional government in the south, the south’s participation in the central government’s power and riches, and a referendum on the independence of Southern Sudan after six years. It also provided for the establishment of the following four UN peace operations in Sudan:

UNMIS

The United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), 2005–2011, was responsible for overseeing the implementation of the CPA and all its aspects.. It is the only mission in Sudan that has been completed so far. UNMIS was successful to the degree that there was no renewed outbreak of tension and war between Northern and Southern Sudan while the mission lasted. UNMIS also successfully organised and supported the logistics of the referendum in Southern Sudan in January 2011, which resulted in the secession of the south from the north, and the creation of the new Republic of South Sudan. Despite this effort, UNMIS did not quite succeed in its tenure to protect the civilian population from attacks from armed groups within the south, or to prevent the military build-up of the newly formed country. Currently, the government of South Sudan is unable to fulfil some basic needs of the majority of the population and has very limited reach in rural areas.

UNAMID

UNAMID (United Nations African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur) was established in 2008. It replaced an unsuccessful peace mission of the African Union that was mandated in 2004 that not only suffered from a lack of funds, but also from the lack of political will of all fighting parties to search for a political solutions. The mandate of UNAMID is to actively intervene in humanitarian efforts, to protect civilians from attacks and to implement the Darfur Peace Agreement of 2006. The Darfur Peace Agreement was signed between the Government of Sudan and a faction of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) led by Minni Minnawa. It was rejected by other fighting forces, such as the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and a rival faction of the SLA, which significantly limited its impact and ability to halt further armed violence. In fact, UNAMID staff became targets of this violence in the form of attacks, kidnapping and robbery of mission vehicles and equipment, UNAMID was totally unprepared for such circumstances. Furthermore, the concept of a hybrid mission (partnership between the United Nations and the African Union) was difficult to implement as neither partner could agree on a common leadership of the mission. The Sudanese government hampered UNAMID-deployments by imposing levies and a ban on night flights and by refusing to allocate land. Only in 2010, two years later than planned, did UNAMID forces reach the foreseen minimum of personnel. At that time the only faction of the SLA that had signed the peace agreement violated it and again took up arms against the government. After independence of South Sudan, the fighting between the Sudanese Army and the fighting groups in Darfur increased. Under these circumstances, the mission is currently devoting most of its activities to safeguarding their own equipment, personnel, and humanitarian convoys and camps for refugees rather than taking on their responsibility to protect the civilian population. Any attempts at mediation by the UN–AU partners have failed so far.

Despite their Chapter VII mandate, UNMIS and UNAMID have had little impact on protecting civilians and promoting peace. Rather, they have been limited to continued observation of the situation and implementing civilian and logistical activities.

UNIFSA

UNIFSA (United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei) was sent to contested border areas between northern and southern Sudan in June 2011 with the aim to contain the escalation of violence, the displacement of the civilian population and to demilitarise the border region of Abyei. UNIFSA has a responsibility to protect those who live in the border area and humanitarian aid organisations that work there. Unfortunately, since the independence of South Sudan, tensions in the border area have continued to increase.

UNMISS

UNMISS (United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan) was established in July 2011 after independence of South Sudan and builds on the infrastructure of UNMIS. Intended to last one year, its mission is to strengthen peace and security and to lay the foundations for development. Like its predecessor UNMIS, UNMISS aims at stabilising the state, democracy and the rule of law in South Sudan, ultimately resulting in security for the community of states and the region.

Difficult conditions for UN operations

The majority of the South Sudanese and Sudanese populations are weary of the state. This is due to the history of Sudan in which power holders have frequently played ethnic groups against one another, lined their own pockets and moved friends or former enemies into influential posts, the latter in order to keep them in check. The ongoing neglect of rural areas in both countries by development policy also does not help to increase trust in the state and government. A consequence of strong population movements, poorly performing security forces and easy access to small arms is that heavy tensions regarding land, water and other resource conflicts in South Sudan light up and explode with deadly violence. Recently, a new form of patriarchal suppression has developed with deep chasms between the sexes and generations. Armed power struggles between militia leaders and the SPLA (Sudan's People Liberation Army) further threaten national and human security.

The six years of power-sharing in the Republic of Sudan ended with new violent conflicts in regions that had been under the control of the SPLA/M during the civil war. These regional groups and resistance groups in Darfur have increasingly joined forces to fight against the government of President Omar el-Bashir for whom the International Court of Justice has issued an arrest warrant based on his responsibility for the killing of civilians in Darfur. As long as armed resistance groups consider civil war to be a solution to their grievances, and regime change an objective, it is questionable whether UN peace operations can work effectively. Under certain circumstances they can contribute to creating a secure environment and open space for political solutions. In the case of UNAMID, this has not happened. UNMIS, on the other hand, is an example of the fact that political negotiations can lay the foundations for a peace mission that is both recognised and respected by all conflict parties.

Sources and further information:

• Grawert, Elke (2011): Sudan: Interventionen light?, in: IFSH/HSFK/BICC/INEF/FEST: Friedensgutachten 2011. Berlin: Lit: 223-234. (German)
• Mission UNAMID
• Mission UNMIS
• Mission UNMISS
• Mission UNISFA
• Prunier, Gérard (2010): Rwanda and Darfur: A Comparative Approach to Two Peacekeeping Failures, in: Journal of International Peacekeeping 14: 117-133.