International law and peace missions

Peace missions of any kind are not explicitly provided for in the UN Charter. Peace missions are defined as all multilateral peace operations that are launched to help stabilise societies after an external or internal violent conflict, to maintain peace or to build the foundations for a durable peace.

However, the Charter gives the UN Security Council "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" (Art. 24(19)). In fulfilling this responsibility, the implementation of UN peacekeeping operations has proven to be an important tool for international crisis management. Such UN operations, where soldiers from all over the world wear UN Blue Helmets as part of their uniform, have to be mandated by the UN Security Council.

Other organisations, too, such as the European Union, the African Union or other regional organisations can conduct peace missions When they contain military components, these missions are only in compliance with international law if the UN Security Council has provided these organizations with a mandate for carrying out the missions. This is due to the general prohibition of violence in international relations, which Member States agree to when they sign the UN Charter (Article 2(2)). Apart from the UN mandate, there is only one exception from this general prohibition of violence: the right to self-defence if any state comes under attack (Article 51, UN Charter). This right, is only valid until the Security Council takes action as it deems necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.

According to the UN Charter, the Security Council can take all action it deems necessary to settle conflicts peacefully (conflict prevention, settlement, etc.) (Chapter VI). Should this action not have the desired effect, the Council can ascertain whether there is any “threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or act of aggression” and decide what measures shall be taken "to maintain or restore international peace and security" (Chapter VII, Article 39) Such measures "not involving the use of armed forces", may include diplomatic and economic sanctions according to Chapter VII, Article 41. Should these measures be inadequate, the Council can decide to take "action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security" (Article 42). These military measures can be led by UN units or by individual states or groups of states mandated by the Security Council.

As mentioned earlier, UN peacekeeping missions have no explicit foundation in either Chapter VI or Chapter VII of the UN Charter. They can be interpreted as somewhat of a combination of these two chapters, which is why former UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld referred to them in 1956 as "Chapter Six and a Half." Since then, the Security Council has increasingly founded its decisions on Chapter VII of the Charter when mandating peacekeeping operations in post-conflict situations, when a state is not able to guarantee public safety and order. As such, 'robust' mandates of UN units, which allow for the use of force not only for self-defence, but also to enforce peace mission mandates, have been provided with a stronger foundation.

An important principle of peacekeeping operations is the fact that conflict parties, or at least the government of the affected state, have to consent to the deployment of Blue Helmets. This way, the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity can be observed. Also, obtaining such consent is important for the ability of international actors to move and work without obstruction. This principle is valid both for UN-led and UN-mandated missions. Challenges arise when there is a formal consent by the government but when there has been no previous attempt at settling the conflict internally. In this case, UN- or UN-mandated troops are often regarded as a warring party to the conflict. This, for instance, is the case in Afghanistan, where Security Council resolutions can be based on the consent of the Afghan government, but where there is no internal reconciliation as of yet.

Another challenge is the fact that, recently, some states have limited or withdrawn their consent to UN operations even though the objective of the mission has not been achieved. This, for instance, was the case in 2010 in Burundi, Chad and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Reasons for this are mainly power-political interests of those who govern the respective countries, but also in part the inefficiency of the peace operations themselves.

The degree to which UN-mandated missions are implemented according to the spirit and letter of Security Council resolutions and the UN Charter is also contested. During the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, which was a UN-mandated peace enforcing mission, for instance, US troops attacked returning Iraqi troops on Iraqi soil—after the declaration of a ceasefire—and destroyed them. During the UN-mandated NATO operation in Libya in 2010, the Security Council resolution foresaw the use of military forces to protect Libyan civilians. What is more, Western governments declared that the objective of the mission was a political regime change—an objective that was not covered by the UN resolution.

The legitimacy of peace operations is also weakened by the following developments:

• Wherever peace missions act without previous consent of all parties to the conflict and have taken over executive functions for a longer period of time (as was the case in Kosovo) the people’s right to self-determination and democracy itself is eroded. Anti-colonial impulses could be a consequence.
• According to international law, the UN Security Council is the only institution that can decide upon military action against states or armed powers. Yet, it cannot enforce this privilege against the super powers that have a right to veto Security Council decisions. When, after a preliminary end of the fighting after military action not mandated by the Security Council—as in Kosovo or Iraq—the Security Council establishes peace missions and takes over the responsibility for the management of the consequences of that war, the UN effectively legitimises actions and interventions that violated international law.
• In the Security Council, assessments and interests, in particular those of the veto powers, are decisive for decision-making on peace missions. However, as they do not always harmonise, double standards are often applied. The knowledge about super power interests and double standards also burden peace missions that have been unanimously agreed to.

Sources and further information:

• Heintze, Hans-Joachim (2007): Staatszentriertes Völkerrecht und nicht-staatliche Gewaltakteure; in: „Wissenschaft & Frieden“, 2007-2, Bonn. (German)
• Paech, Norman und Gerhard Stuby (2001): Völkerrecht und Macht in den internationalen Beziehungen, Hamburg. (German)
• Volger, Helmut (Hrsg.) (2007): Grundlagen und Strukturen der Vereinten Nationen, München/Wien. (German)
• UN Basis-Informationen 39: „UN-Friedensmissionen“; hrsg. von der Deutschen Gesellschaft für die Vereinten Nationen e. V. (German)
• UN Peacekeeping Operations